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Abstract: This paper presents an alternative explanation of the gender pay gap
resting on a simple Hotelling-style dyopsony model of the labor market. Since there
are only two employers equally productive women and men have to commute and
face travel cost to do so. We assume that a fraction of the women have higher travel
cost, e.g., due to more domestic responsibilities. Employers exploit that women are
less inclined to commute to their competitor and oﬀer lower wages to women. Since
women’s labor supply at the ﬁrm level is for this reason less wage-elastic, this model
presents an explanation of wage discrimination in line with Robinson (1933).
Zusammenfassung: Das folgende Papier gibt eine alternative Erkl¨ arung geschlechts-
speziﬁscher Lohndiﬀerentiale im Rahmen eines einfachen Dyopsonmodells des
Arbeitsmarktes im Stile von Hotelling. Da nur zwei Arbeitgeber existieren, sind
gleichproduktive Frauen und M¨ anner gezwungen, zu ihrem Arbeitgeber zu pendeln,
wobei Reisekosten entstehen. Es wird angenommen, dass ein Teil der Frauen h¨ ohere
Reisekosten aufweist, z.B. aufgrund h¨ auslicher Verpﬂichtungen. Die Arbeitgeber
machen sich zunutze, dass Frauen eine geringere Pendelneigung aufweisen und daher
in geringerem Maße den Arbeitgeber wechseln, indem sie ihnen geringere L¨ ohne
anbieten. Da das Arbeitsangebot von Frauen auf Firmenebene aus diesem Grunde
weniger lohnelastisch ist, stellt dies eine Erkl¨ arung von Lohndiskriminierung im
Sinne von Robinson (1933) dar.
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1 Introduction
One of the stylized facts of labor markets is that on average women earn substantially
less than men. For example, Altonji & Blank (1999, table 4) report for the U.S. a
raw wage diﬀerential of about 28 per cent in 1995. While its extent is reduced by
introducing controls for individual characteristics (such as education, occupation,
and experience), a gender pay gap remains that is of remarkable size in all OECD
countries (cf. OECD 2002). In addition to reﬂecting diﬀerences in human capital or
occupational segregation, the gap also may reﬂect discrimination against women.
Theoretical attempts of explaining discrimination often follow Becker’s (1971)
concept of discrimination due to distaste. Since some employers dislike employing
women, which is modeled by means of a distaste parameter in the employers’ utility
function, they oﬀer lower wages to women, ceteris paribus. However, this kind of
reasoning suﬀers from two severe shortcomings. On the one hand, it is diﬃcult
to interpret the gender pay gap as a long-run equilibrium outcome using Becker’s
concept of discrimination without assuming some sort of market power on the
demand-side because under perfect competition discrimination due to distaste should
be competed away in the long run. On the other hand, even if ﬁrms had some market
power, the ﬁrm that engages in discrimination due to distaste would earn less proﬁts
than its non-discriminating competitors (cf., e.g., Bowlus & Eckstein 2002, Bhaskar
et al. 2002). Therefore it may be promising to look at an alternative explanation
of discrimination given by Robinson (1933) where ﬁrms do proﬁt from engaging in
discrimination.
In this paper we will utilize a simple Hotelling-style dyopsony model of the labor
market to analyze the link between gender diﬀerences in mobility patterns, the
gender pay gap, and Robinsonian wage discrimination. By doing so we aim at giving
a reformulation of Robinsonian wage discrimination by means of a new monopsony
model of horizontal job diﬀerentiation. The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 introduces the concepts of Robinsonian wage discrimination, ﬁrm-
level labor supply, and horizontal job diﬀerentiation in some detail, which are the
key building blocks of the following analyses. Section 3 sets up the formal model:
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 discuss the workers’ and the ﬁrms’ behavior, while section 3.3
analyzes the resulting equilibrium and investigates its properties, in particular its link
to Robinsonian wage discrimination. Section 4 draws some conclusions. An appendix
contains some of the proofs involved.4
2 Robinsonian Wage Discrimination, Firm-Level Labor
Supply, and Horizontal Job Diﬀerentiation
Robinson was the ﬁrst to apply Pigou’s (1932) concept of third-degree price discrim-
ination at a commodity market to the labor market. She argued that if groups of
workers can be distinguished that diﬀer in their labor supply elasticities at the ﬁrm-
level the ﬁrm will proﬁt from paying diﬀerent wages to these groups. The more elastic
groups will get higher wages than the less elastic groups, ceteris paribus. ‘Just as
we have price discrimination for a monopolist, so we may have price discrimination
for a monopsonist.’ (Robinson 1933, p. 224) Hence, if women’s labor supply at the
ﬁrm-level is less elastic than men’s women will earn lower wages, other things being
equal.
While there is empirical evidence that women’s labor supply is even more elastic
at the market level (e.g., Cahuc & Zylberberg 2004, pp. 39–41), where the decision
is whether to supply labor or not, this need not to hold at the ﬁrm level. From the
single ﬁrm’s point of view it matters only whether an individual supplies labor to
this ﬁrm or another so that both unemployed and employed workers are potential
suppliers of labor to this ﬁrm. Therefore ﬁrm-level labor supply and market-level
labor supply are completely diﬀerent concepts with the former being the relevant
concept for Robinsonian wage discrimination.1 Just recently, Ransom & Oaxaca
(2005) and Hirsch et al. (2006) found that women’s labor supply at the ﬁrm level is
indeed substantially less elastic than men’s so that Robinsonian wage discrimination
is not rejected by the data and might be one explanation of the persistent empirical
regularity of the gender pay gap.
While Robinsonian wage discrimination gives a simple and intuitively appealing
explanation of the gender pay gap, it diﬀers fundamentally from Becker’s (1971)
concept of discrimination due to distaste. The reason is that ﬁrms’ only motive for
engaging in Robinsonian wage discrimination is that they can increase their proﬁts by
doing so. Thus, ﬁrms actions remain proﬁt maximizing and need not to be governed
by (costly) prejudices embodied in a Beckerian distaste parameter for Robinsonian
wage discrimination to work.
Nevertheless, in spite of its intuitive appeal not much tribute is paid to
Robinsonian wage discrimination. For instance, Altonji & Blank’s (1999) comprehen-
1 Since Robinson’s (1933) original argument was given within the standard static model of
monopsony, where there is only a single employer demanding for labor, there was no room for
distinguishing ﬁrm-level and market-level labor supply. Perhaps this is the main reason that
the standard argument given against Robinsonian wage discrimination – that women’s labor
supply at the market-level is more elastic than men’s – still seems so convincing.5
sive summary of race and gender in the labor market does not refer to it at all. Hence,
Robinsonian wage discrimination might seem as an idea whose time has passed
which parallels to some extent the little interest paid to monopsony in general.2
Since Robinson’s (1933) analysis assumes monopsony power in the classic sense of a
single employer one might indeed doubt its relevance. The new monopsony literature,
however, whose ﬁrst systematic exposition and application to nearly all traditional
issues of labor economics is given by Manning (2003a), highlights that monopsony
power may even arise if there are many ﬁrms competing for workers. Other than in
a perfect competition framework where labor supply to the ﬁrm is inﬁnitely elastic,
models of new monopsony are able to generate upward-sloping ﬁrm-level labor supply
curves due to search frictions, heterogeneous preferences among workers and mobility
costs. While Manning (2003a) focusses on the impact of search frictions by utilizing
equilibrium search models with wage posting in the fashion of Burdett & Mortensen
(1998), the impact of heterogenous preferences among workers and mobility costs is
analyzed by Bhaskar et al. (2002) and Bhaskar & To (1999, 2003) within models of
horizontal job diﬀerentiation.
Analogously to models of horizontal product diﬀerentiation, models of horizontal
job diﬀerentiation assume that diﬀerent jobs have diﬀerent non-wage characteristics
and that workers diﬀer in their preferences over these characteristics. Examples
are the work schedule, the job speciﬁcation, or the distance of the workplace from
the worker’s home.3 Hotelling (1929) sets up a model in which otherwise identical
consumers are located at diﬀerent places and have to travel to buy commodities
because ﬁrms (and the goods they sell) do not exist at each potential location. Hence,
consumers diﬀer only in one dimension, their geographical location. Of course, one
might think of location in a less geographical context. For example, one might think
of preferences over a characteristic of the commodity of interest.
Hotelling’s model can be used to model horizontal job diﬀerentiation in a similar
way: Otherwise identical workers are located at diﬀerent places, while employers do
not exist at each potential location. Workers commute and face travel cost to do
so.4 This travel cost can be both direct and indirect. Direct cost results because
traveling on its own is not costless, whereas indirect cost results, for instance, from
2 An interesting discussion of this is given by Manning (2003a, pp. 6–10).
3 Unlike vertical job diﬀerentiation, utilized by the theory of compensating wage diﬀerentials
that distinguishes ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs, horizontal job diﬀerentiation just assumes diﬀerent
preferences over non-wage characteristics so that some jobs are ‘good’ for some workers and
‘bad’ for others.
4 Again, one might think of this literally in a geographical way or, more generally, one might
think of diﬀerent preferences over non-wage job characteristics that demand ‘traveling’, i.e.
abdication of some preferred job characteristics. We will, however, stick to the case that
employers are horizontally diﬀerentiated due to their locations.6
the fact that traveling requires time – and thus imposes opportunity costs – and
that traveling might be uncomfortable to the workers. Hotelling’s (1929) model and
its extensions by Salop (1979) provide the basis for the models of horizontal job
diﬀerentiation proposed by Bhaskar & To (1999, 2003). The quintessential idea of
these models is presented by Bhaskar et al. (2002) in a Hotelling-style dyopsony
model which they discuss by means of a graphical exposition.5
We will employ this simple dyopsony model in the following to investigate
wage discrimination of equally productive men and women.6 Jobs are horizontally
diﬀerentiated because ﬁrms’ locations diﬀer. We assume that a fraction of the women
diﬀer from the men in terms of higher travel cost. We argue that this is the case
because these women face higher opportunity cost of commuting as they play a more
prominent role in household production than men, which is in line with empirical
observation. Employers exploit that (some) women are less mobile and thus less
inclined to take up a job with a competitor by oﬀering lower wages to women.
3 The Model
3.1 Workers’ Labor Supply to Firms
Assume that equally productive workers’ homes are uniformly distributed
along the unit interval [0,1]. At each end of this line there is a ﬁrm demanding
labor, ﬁrm 0 at the one end and ﬁrm 1 at the other end. Workers supply a unit of
labor wage-inelastically as long as they gain a positive income from working so that
they have a reservation income of zero. Moreover, a worker will choose the employer
such that her or his income is maximized.
Next, suppose all workers face linear travel cost, that is travel cost are
proportional to distance. Workers, however, diﬀer in their travel cost. There are
three groups of workers, each uniformly distributed on [0,1]: male workers, female
workers with identical travel cost as male workers, and females with higher travel
cost than the other two groups. More precisely, we have a mass µ of male workers
who face travel cost t > 0 per unit length, and a unit mass of female workers, where
a share λ, 0 < λ 6 1, of female workers face higher travel cost t > t > 0 than male
workers, while a share 1−λ of them face the same travel cost t as men. Therefore a
man or a low-cost woman located at 0 6 x 6 1 has travel cost of tx to get to ﬁrm 0
and t(1 − x) to get to ﬁrm 1, while for a high-cost woman these costs are given by
5 To our knowledge the ﬁrst presentation of this dyopsony model is due to Veendorp (1981).
6 For an analysis of Robinsonian wage discrimination within a search model see Schlicht
(1982). Madden (1977) investigates Robinsonian wage discrimination for segmented local labor
markets.7
tx and t(1 − x), respectively. The farther ﬁrm 0, i.e. the larger x, the higher is the
worker’s travel cost to get to ﬁrm 0 and the lower is his travel cost to get to ﬁrm 1.
Accordingly, the higher x the more she or he prefers to work for ﬁrm 1.
What might be reasons for diﬀerent travel cost among women? A reason for this
might be that high-cost women have higher indirect travel cost because they play
a more exposed role in household production, particularly in rearing children, than
the other women and men so that they attach a higher disutility to the time loss due
to commuting, i.e. they face higher opportunity cost of traveling. This is also in line
with empirical evidence. For instance, Hersch & Stratton (1997) show that for the
U.S. married women’s housework time is, on average, three times that of married
men’s and that women’s more dominant role in housework is able to explain part of
the gender pay gap in wage regressions. Furthermore, Manning (2003a, pp. 203/4)
presents some evidence for the UK that travel-to-work times are lower for women
than men, especially for those with more domestic responsibilities.
Firms are assumed to oﬀer wages independent of workers’ location separately







1 for ﬁrm 1. A man located at x receives an income of wm
0 − tx
when working for ﬁrm 0 and an income of wm
1 − t(1 − x) when working for ﬁrm 1.
Therefore he will work for ﬁrm 0 as long as wm
0 −tx > wm
1 −t(1−x) and for ﬁrm 1
if the opposite holds as long as his income – i.e., the respective wage oﬀer less travel
cost – from doing so is nonnegative, for otherwise he would choose not to work at
all. In particular, if wm
0 +wm





1 > t all female workers will participate in the labor market which we
will assume from now on. As we shall see later, this will indeed hold in equilibrium
if ﬁrms are suﬃciently productive. Thus, the location, at which male workers are









1 −t 6 wm
0 6 wm
1 +t where all men located at x < xm prefer working for ﬁrm 0
and all men located at x > xm prefer working for ﬁrm 1 (see ﬁgure 1). If, otherwise,
wm
0 < wm
1 − t ﬁrm 0’s wage compared to its competitor is such low that no male
worker wants to work for ﬁrm 0 at all, whereas if wm
0 > wm
1 +t the opposite holds and
every male worker wants to work for ﬁrm 0. Using the same reasoning the locations,
at which high-cost and low-cost female workers are indiﬀerent between working for










Figure 1: The indiﬀerent workers’ locations xm, xf, and xf.
if w
f




















1 + t, respectively, where again each high-cost and low-cost
woman left to the respective indiﬀerent female worker prefers working for ﬁrm 0 and





1 − t no woman wants to work for ﬁrm 0, whereas if w
f





only some high-cost women ﬁnd it proﬁtable to work for ﬁrm 0.
Making use of the reasoning in the last paragraph we get ﬁrms’ labor supply of
men and women. On the one hand, the labor supply of men for ﬁrm 0 is the mass of
workers left to the indiﬀerent male worker xm. On the other hand, the labor supply
of men for ﬁrm 1 is the mass of male workers right to xm. Thus, ﬁrm i’s male labor
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where i = 0,1 and j 6= i. Analogously, women’s labor supply to ﬁrm 0 is the mass of
high-cost and low-cost women left to the respective indiﬀerent female worker, while
their labor supply to ﬁrm 1 is the mass right to her. Hence, ﬁrm i’s female labor9
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Both male and female labor supply are increasing in ﬁrm i’s own wage and decreasing
in its competitor’s wage (as long as |wm
0 − wm




1| < t). As a
consequence, this simple dyopsony model generates upward-sloping ﬁrm-level labor
supply curves for both women and men as long as the travel costs are not very small
and the oﬀered wages are not too diﬀerent.
3.2 Firms’ Wage-Setting Behavior
We now turn to ﬁrms’ decisions. Firms are considered to behave as proﬁt maximizers.




i , respectively. Thus, women and men are assumed to be perfect
substitutes in production which reﬂects our assumptions that men and women are
equally productive and supply the same amount of labor whenever they receive a
nonnegative income from doing so. We assume further that ﬁrms may diﬀer in their
productivity levels. In particular, we allow for ﬁrms employing diﬀerent production
technologies. Firms’ production functions Fi are assumed to be twice continuously
diﬀerentiable with positive, decreasing marginal products and linearly homogenous
so that
Qi ≡ Fi(Ki,Li) ≡ Lifi(ki), (6)
where ki ≡ Ki/Li, fi(ki) ≡ Fi(ki,1) and FiK,FiL,f0
i > 0 as well as FiKK,FiLL,f00
i < 0
with i = 0,1.
Let πi denote ﬁrm i’s proﬁts which are i’s revenue net of labor and capital costs,
i.e.









where pi denotes ﬁrm i’s output price and r the uniform capital rental rate. Next,
we follow Bhaskar & To (2003) and deﬁne ﬁrms’ net revenue product of labor
φi ≡ φi(r/pi) ≡ pi[fi[ki(r/pi)] − f0
i[ki(r/pi)]ki(r/pi)], where ki(r/pi) is the capital-10
labor ratio optimally chosen by ﬁrm i for a given r/pi.7 Firm i’s problem is to ﬁnd
optimal wage oﬀers wm
i and w
f
i both for male and female workers that maximize i’s
proﬁts given ﬁrm j’s wage oﬀers, i.e. wage oﬀers wm
i and w
f




































where we used ﬁrm i’s previously deﬁned net revenue product of labor.
We can now express more precisely what is meant by allowing for diﬀerences
in ﬁrms’ productivity levels. We consider potential diﬀerences in ﬁrms’ net revenue
products of labor. Therefore we allow for φ0 6= φ1. There are two reasons for that.
The ﬁrst is that ﬁrms may have diﬀerent market power in their output markets
giving rise to diﬀerent output prices p0 6= p1 so that φ0 = φ(r/p0) 6= φ(r/p1) = φ1
because φi is strictly monotone decreasing in r/pi and, thus, injective. Another reason
may be that ﬁrms employ diﬀerent production technologies so that ﬁrms production
functions diﬀer, i.e. F1 6= F0, yielding (potentially) diﬀerent net revenue products of
labor even if ﬁrms face the same ratio r/p, that is φ0 = φ0(r/p) 6= φ1(r/p) = φ1 for
some r/p. Therefore we assume from now on that φ0 6= φ1 may be the case for one
or even both of these reasons.




i that maximize overall proﬁts as given by (8) into two independent
problems, namely of ﬁnding a wage oﬀer wm
i that maximizes proﬁts from the
employment of men given ﬁrm j’s wage oﬀer wm
j and ﬁnding a wage oﬀer w
f
i that
maximizes proﬁts from the employment of women given ﬁrm j’s wage oﬀer w
f
j. This
is possible because women and men are perfect substitutes in production and ﬁrms
are supposed to set wages separately for women and men and to use a constant










































7 Obviously, φi is closely linked to ﬁrm i’s marginal revenue product of labor which is given by
piFiL(Ki,Li) = pi[fi(ki)−f0
i(ki)ki]. The proﬁt-maximizing capital-labor ratio must necessarily
satisfy πiK = 0 and, thus, f0
i(ki) = r/pi. Since f00
i < 0 holds f0
i is invertible and we get
ki(r/pi) ≡ ki = (f0
i)−1(r/pi) so that the optimal capital-labor ratio is a strictly monotone
decreasing function of r/pi and unique due to fi’s strict concavity.11
with i = 0,1 and j 6= i. Inserting equations (4) and (5) for ﬁrm i’s female and male
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We now assume that ﬁrms simultaneously determine the wages they oﬀer to
women and men. This gives two independent static wage-setting games of complete
information, where we are interested in ﬁnding Nash equilibria for both games.8 A
ﬁrst conclusion that can be drawn from the payoﬀ functions of ﬁrm i represented by
(12) and (13) is that ﬁrm i will never oﬀer a wage above its net revenue product of
labor because it would incur losses otherwise so that wm
i ,w
f
i 6 φi. Before we try to
derive reaction functions, which give ﬁrm i’s optimally chosen wage for some wage
oﬀer wj of its competitor, we can use the principle of iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies to show that under some non-restrictive parameter restrictions
we can concentrate on those cases where |wm
0 − wm




1| < t hold,
which immensely simpliﬁes the following analyses.
Lemma 1 (Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies)
(a) If |φ0−φ1| < t elimination of strictly dominated strategies yields |wm
0 −wm
1 | < t.





8 If we assumed that ﬁrms ﬁrst determine wages for men and then for women, or vice versa
this would change the solution concept (from Nash equilibrium to subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium), but not the results because the only subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium involves
the same outcome as in the case where both games are played simultaneously, which follows
immediately from applying backwards induction.12
If even
|φ0 − φ1| < 2t −
tt
λt + (1 − λ)t
(14)





Proof. See the appendix. 
Lemma 1 therefore requires that ﬁrms are not too diﬀerent. Otherwise the more
productive ﬁrm may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to oﬀer much higher wages than its less
productive competitor which could even be driven out of the market if diﬀerences
become too large. If ﬁrms are symmetric, i.e. φ0 = φ1, |wm
0 −wm




















1| < t. Hence, the proﬁts from employing men and women






















j) = (φi − w
f
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respectively. Maximization of (15) with respect to wm
i and (16) with respect to w
f
i
as well as some rearranging of the respective ﬁrst-order conditions gives ﬁrm i’s
reaction function, that is the optimally chosen wage for men and women given ﬁrm

































i are increasing in wm
j and w
f
j we have strategic complemen-
tarity in wage setting.
3.3 The Equilibrium and Its Properties
Mutually best responses yield unique, globally stable Nash equilibria in pure
strategies with equilibrium wage oﬀers ˆ wm
0 , ˆ wm
1 , ˆ w
f
0, and ˆ w
f
1 in which all workers13
participate in the labor market if ﬁrms are suﬃciently productive as is shown by the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Wage Oﬀers) If the conditions stated in lemma 1
hold there exists a unique, globally stable Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for both





















λt + (1 − λ)t
, (20)
respectively, where i = 0,1 and j 6= i. Furthermore, only if φ0 + φ1 >
2tt
λt+(1−λ)t + t
then all workers will participate in the labor market and the equilibria derived will
exist.
Proof. Making use of the reaction functions (17) and (18), the equilibrium wage oﬀers












i )] so that (19) and
(20) follow immediately. This gives indeed unique and globally stable Nash equilibria
in pure strategies due to the linearity of the reaction functions (see ﬁgure 2). Finally,
if φ0 + φ1 >
2tt
λt+(1−λ)t + t then ˆ w
f
0 + ˆ w
f
1 > t and ˆ wm
0 + ˆ wm
1 > t follow directly from
(19) and (20) so that every worker gains a nonnegative income from working and
therefore decides to participate in the labor market. 
Figure 2: The equilibrium wage oﬀers ˆ wm
0 , ˆ wm
1 , ˆ w
f
0, and ˆ w
f
1.
Note that if ﬁrms are suﬃciently productive all workers will participate in the
labor market due to ˆ wm
0 + ˆ wm
1 > t and ˆ w
f
0 + ˆ w
f
1 > t. If this were not the case the14
equilibria derived would fail to exist because we would have local monopsonists
without strategic interaction for female or for both female and male workers.
According to (19) and (20) both female and male workers will receive (and accept)
wage oﬀers that are below their respective marginal products. Interestingly, ﬁrm i’s
wage oﬀer not only depends on i’s own productivity, but also on j’s, even though
to a lesser extent. The latter eﬀect reﬂects the impact of wage competition among
employers which is, however, not complete because ﬁrm i’s own characteristics partly
determine the wages paid by i in equilibrium. Another interesting point to mention
is the link between productivity, ﬁrm size, and wages. From (19) and (20) it follows
immediately that in equilibrium the more productive ﬁrm in terms of a higher net
revenue product of labor oﬀers higher wages both to men and women. And this,
in turn, implies according to (4) and (5) that the more productive ﬁrm is also the
larger one in terms of employment, i.e. it employs both more men and women than
the less productive ﬁrm. Therefore this model is consistent with two stylized facts of
labor markets, viz. the employer size-wage eﬀect and the positive correlation between
productivity and wages (cf., e.g., Oi & Idson 1999). Eventually, note that if ﬁrms
are symmetric they oﬀer the same wages and employ both half of the men and half
of the women in the market.
Next, we are interested in diﬀerences in the labor market outcomes of men and
women. Therefore we consider the equilibrium wage diﬀerential ∆w ≡ ˆ wm
i − ˆ w
f
i
between male and female workers.
Corollary 1 (Equilibrium Wage Diﬀerential) The equilibrium wage diﬀeren-
tial between male and female workers is given by
∆w =
(t − [λt + (1 − λ)t])t
λt + (1 − λ)t
(21)
It is the same in ﬁrms 0 and 1. Moreover, it is positive and strictly monotone
increasing both in the travel cost of high-cost women t and the share of high-cost
women among female workers λ.
Proof. Subtracting (20) from (19) yields (21) which is positive because of t >
λt + (1 − λ)t for all 0 < λ 6 1. It is also independent of ﬁrms’ characteristics,
i.e. their net revenue products of labor. Furthermore, the wage diﬀerential is strictly
monotone increasing both in the travel cost of high-cost women t and the share of











[λt + (1 − λ)t]2 > 0, (23)
which completes the proof of corollary 1. 
The consequence of corollary 1 is that women earn less than men in equilibrium
even though men and women are equally productive and perfect substitutes in
production just because a share of women face higher travel cost. The reasoning
is as follows: Since ﬁrms cannot distinguish low- and high-cost women ex ante all
women receive lower wage oﬀers in equilibrium as ﬁrms know that women face higher
travel cost than men on average. Therefore the average woman is less inclined
to change employers for wage-related reasons because she avoids commuting to a
greater extent than a man which in turn reduces competition among employers for
female workers. Hence, even low-cost women who do not diﬀer from men in terms of
productivity and travel cost are aﬀected as they receive and accept lower wage oﬀers
than men due to statistical discrimination by the ﬁrms. Furthermore, the extent
of wage discrimination erodes as the share of high-cost women declines and as the
travel cost of high-cost women reduces, which aﬃrms intuition.9
Next, we consider the equilibrium wage elasticity of ﬁrm’s female and male labor
supply. As Robinsonian wage discrimination arises if and only if women’s labor
supply to ﬁrms is less elastic than men’s it is of particular interest to investigate
whether gender-speciﬁc labor supply elasticities diﬀer and whether the diﬀerence
goes in the same direction as it would if Robinsonian wage discrimination occurred.
If this were the case another point of interest would be the link between diﬀerences
in elasticities and the wage diﬀerential. The following corollary 2 shows that not
only women’s labor supply at the ﬁrm level is less elastic than men’s, but also that
a direct link between the elasticity and the wage diﬀerential arises.
9 One might ask whether this sort of wage discrimination is a long-run equilibrium outcome. If
ﬁrms choose wages once-for-all, an assumption typically made in search-theoretic models used
to analyze oligopsonistic labor markets, such as the model by Burdett & Mortensen (1998),
then the gender pay gap from corollary 1 will obviously be a long-run equilibrium outcome.
Furthermore, the assumption that employers choose wages once-for-all seems quite reasonable
in a steady-state environment, which is assumed by those models (cf., e.g., Coles 2001).
Things get more complicated if we allow for inﬁnitely repeated interaction between employers.
Analogously to the large tacit collusion literature (e.g., Ivaldi et al. 2007), there might be
feasible collusive wage oﬀers in this case, where women whose reservation incomes are higher
than men’s (in terms of wage oﬀered plus travel cost for high-cost women) get a higher wage
than men in order to guarantee their participation in the market. We do not want to go into
details, but note the following: If tacit collusion does not work in the sense that both ﬁrms play
non-cooperatively such that every period’s outcome is the Nash equilibrium from proposition
1 then the gender pay gap from corollary 1 appears every period and is, thus, again a long-run
equilibrium outcome – even if we allow for repeated interaction.16
Corollary 2 (Equilibrium Firm-Level Labor Supply Elasticities)
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(c) The equilibrium diﬀerential in male and female labor supply elasticities to ﬁrm
i ∆ε,i ≡ εm
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where i = 0,1 and j 6= i. It is positive and proportional to the wage diﬀerential.
Furthermore, it is also strictly monotone increasing both in the travel cost of
high-cost women t and the share of high-cost women among female workers λ.
Proof. See the appendix. 
First of all, it is interesting to note that women’s labor supply to the ﬁrm is
less elastic than men’s even though both women and men supply labor totally
inelastically at the market level. This aﬃrms theoretically the importance of
distinguishing market-level and ﬁrm-level labor supply when investigating ﬁrms’
potential to engage in wage discrimination due to monopsonistic wage-setting power.
There is some empirical evidence (e.g., Ransom & Oaxaca (2005) and Hirsch
et al. (2006)) that women’s labor supply at the ﬁrm-level is indeed less elastic,
even though women’s labor supply at the market-level might be not. Furthermore,
the proportionality of the wage and the elasticity diﬀerential has an important
consequence: Diﬀerences in elasticities necessarily imply diﬀerences in outcomes,
and vice versa. Therefore the results from corollary 2 make clear that the wage
diﬀerential and the elasticity diﬀerential are two sides of the same coin which gives
another interesting result in line with Robinsonian wage discrimination. For this
reasons we get an explanation why elasticities of men and women might diﬀer,17
namely due to diﬀerences in mobility arising from diﬀerences in travel costs, which
are the underlying force of both wage and elasticity diﬀerences.
Eventually, one might also ask which ﬁrm employs more women relative to men.
Let γi denote the share of women among ﬁrm i’s workers in equilibrium with i = 0,1.
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j ). The following corollary answers this question.
Corollary 3 (Equilibrium Job Location of Female Workers) The higher is
ﬁrm i’s net revenue product of labor φi the lower is its share of women among workers
γi where i = 0,1. In particular, this means that the more productive ﬁrm will employ
less women relatively to men in equilibrium than its less productive competitor.
Proof. Inserting (19) and (20) into (4) and (5), respectively, and bearing in mind
that | ˆ ws
0 − ˆ ws
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so that γi decreases as φi increases. Since γ0 = γ1 holds if φ0 = φ1 this implies that
the more productive ﬁrm employs less women relatively to men in equilibrium, i.e.
γi < γj if and only if φi > φj. 
The intuition behind this result is rather straightforward. From proposition 1 we
know that the more productive ﬁrm pays higher wages to both men and women and
therefore employs more workers from both groups, which reﬂects the aforementioned
employer size-wage eﬀect. Moreover, we know from corollary 2 that women (on
average) react less elastically to wage changes than men. Hence, the higher wages
oﬀered by the more productive ﬁrm increase the number of male workers to a greater
extent than the number of female workers. And this, in turn, translates into a lower
share of women among the more productive ﬁrm’s workers. The results from corollary
3 add another hypothesis that can be tested empirically: We would expect that more
productive ﬁrms have a lower share of women in their workforce.18
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a Robinsonian explanation of the gender pay gap
based on a Hotelling-style dyopsony model of the labor market in the fashion of
Bhaskar et al.’s (2002) horizontal job diﬀerentiation model. Equally productive
women and men are located at diﬀerent places and supply labor totally inelastically
at the market, while employers with potentially diﬀerent productivity levels exist
only at two locations. Thus, female and male workers commute and face travel cost
to do so, where we assume that a share of the female workers face higher travel
cost than men. Employers who oﬀer wages separately to men and women exploit
the fact that women are less inclined to commute than men (that is that the wage
competition among employers for female workers is less ﬁerce) and pay lower wages
to women than to men in equilibrium. Since employers cannot distinguish low- and
high-cost women even low-cost women who do not diﬀer from men in their behavior
are aﬀected and earn lower wages due to statistical discrimination by the employers.
Furthermore, both men and women earn less than their marginal products because
ﬁrms’ diﬀerent locations give rise to some monopsony power, for labor markets are
to some extent ‘thin’ in the geographical sense (cf. Manning 2003b).
That women are less inclined to commute than men is reﬂected in their lower
ﬁrm-level labor supply elasticity. Therefore gender diﬀerences in wages and in ﬁrm-
level labor supply elasticities are two sides of the same coin, viz. women’s higher
average travel cost. This, in turn, means that the diﬀerence in travel cost and, thus,
in mobility represents the driving force of Robinsonian wage discrimination in this
model. This Robinsonian approach to the gender pay gap has the virtue of explaining
it in lines of ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization. Hence, this reasoning does not suﬀer from the
need to relax the assumption of ﬁrms’ proﬁt-maximizing behavior because there are
no assumptions like a Beckerian distaste parameter involved. As ﬁrms do proﬁt from
paying lower wages to women, they behave like perfectly rational proﬁt maximizers
when discriminating against women.
Additionally, the model generates several hypotheses that can be tested empir-
ically: First, the more productive ﬁrm will pay higher wages to both men and
women and will therefore employ more workers from both groups. The model is
thus consistent with the empirical regularity of an employer size-wage eﬀect as well
as a positive correlation between ﬁrm’s productivity and wages in equilibrium (cf.,
e.g., Oi & Idson 1999). Second, the model predicts that wage diﬀerentials must be
accompanied by diﬀerences in ﬁrm-level labor supply elasticities (not in market-level
labor supply elasticities), where women get paid less if and only if they are the less19
elastic group. These diﬀerences are indeed found by two recent studies, viz. Ransom
& Oaxaca (2005) and Hirsch et al. (2006). Third, the model predicts that the share
of women in the workforce is lower for more productive ﬁrms, which can be tested
empirically, too.
As we noted earlier the driving force of the gender pay gap in this model is
given by the diﬀerence in travel cost between high-cost women and men and the
resulting lower mobility of women on average. And we argued that one of the
most convincing reasons for this diﬀerence is women’s dominant role in housework,
especially in rearing children. In the model there are two variables that directly aﬀect
the magnitude of the gender pay gap: the share of high-cost women among female
workers λ and the travel cost of high-cost women t. Reducing one of these variables
reduces as well the wage diﬀerential between men and women as the elasticity
diﬀerential. Therefore governments may wish to reduce λ and/or t, for example, by
subsidizing or providing additional child care facilities. Hence, this model highlights
the role of gender-speciﬁc diﬀerences in mobility patterns as one explanation for the
gender pay gap and gives an argument why augmenting women’s mobility is likely
to reduce this gap.10
Though we feel conﬁdent that this paper is able to give a reformulation of
Robinsonian wage discrimination in line with the growing new monopsony literature
that is more convincing than its original formulation within the simple monopsony
model with only one employer, the model presented is still highly stylized. For
instance, workers’ labor supply behavior at the market level is modeled in a very
rudimentary way just as a participation decision, whereas the amount of labor
supplied by the individual worker is ﬁxed. Similarly, we dealt with an environment
with only two employers. Future research should relax these (and other) assumptions
to evaluate the robustness of the predictions given by our simple dyopsony model.
Besides, the model generates several testable hypotheses that future research should
investigate empirically. If the model presented gives an explanation of the gender pay
gap that is in line with actual data, much more tribute should be paid to Robinsonian
wage discrimination as an alternative monopsonistic explanation of the gender pay
gap.
10 The model is also able to explain the persistence of a gender pay gap that originally might have
been caused by traditional norms. Household optimization would lead to more housework by
women because women earning less than men may have lower opportunity cost when engaging
in household production. If women’s lower wages were the reason for high-cost women’s more
pronounced aﬃliation to housework and, thus, for their higher travel cost, which in turn – as we
have seen – results in a gender pay gap for all women due to Robinsonian wage discrimination,
this could explain the persistence of women’s more prominent role in household production
even if traditional norms’ inﬂuence may have vanished. While traditional norms might have
been the reason for this in the past, today household optimization would have the same
consequence. Hence, this would constitute some kind of a self-fulﬁlling feedback mechanism.20
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
(a) Assume that ﬁrm i oﬀers a wage wm
i = wm
j −t+ε for some 0 < ε < 2t, where i = 0,1
and j 6= i. Then i’s proﬁts from doing so are given by
[φi − (wm




which follows from (12). This term is positive if and only if φi −wm
j +t > 0. Since j’s
oﬀer must be no more than its net revenue product of labor (otherwise its proﬁts would
be negative), i.e. wm
j 6 φj, (A.1) is always positive if φj − φi < t. Therefore i will not
oﬀer a wage below w
f
j − t which would mean lower, i.e. zero, proﬁts. Since the same
reasoning holds both for ﬁrms 0 and 1 we must have |wm
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1 | < t if |φ0 − φ1| < t.




1| < t if |φ0 − φ1| < t see the proof of (a), mutatis
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we consider the partial derivative of π
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There exists some ε > 0 such that (A.4) is positive if and only if φi − w
f
j + 2t −
tt
λt+(1−λ)t > 0. Since w
f
j 6 φj must hold (A.4) is always positive if φj − φi <
2t −
tt
λt+(1−λ)t is satisﬁed. Bearing in mind that π
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Proof of Corollary 2
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Inserting (A.6) into (4) and bearing in mind that | ˆ wm
0 − ˆ wm
1 | < t must hold under the
conditions stated in lemma 1 we get
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Inserting (A.11) into (5) and bearing in mind that | ˆ w
f
0 − ˆ w
f
1| < t must hold under the
conditions stated in lemma 1 gives
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Moreover, according to (5) we have
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Since the ratio in (A.15) is positive ∆ε,i ∝ ∆w holds. Next, consider the partial









∂λ . Secondly, deﬁne ψ ≡ 1
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